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Abstract 
Study provides empirical evidence on the crime-inequality nexus in Africa using a panel data of 
38 countries from 2007-2012. Using the pooled ordinary least squares and difference-GMM, 
results reveal that inequality aggravates violent crime, rule of law has a reducing effect on 
violent crime, death penalty is not a deterrent factor, increase in urban population contributes to 
rising crime, primary education has a reducing impact, unemployment aggravates violent crime, 
and homicide rate is higher in Southern Africa while lower in North Africa relative to West Africa. 
However, homicide rate does not seem to be counter-cyclical, and criminal inertia is not 
significant.  
 




The rate of criminal activities in Africa has over the past decades increased considerably 
which has become a foremost social problem inhibiting developmental progress in the region. 
It is predictable that attendant changes in criminal activities will occur as economies transition 
from traditional to modern ways of life in order to experience socio-economic and cultural 
changes. The general dearth of investigation into criminality and social responses to crime in 
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Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has emphasised the importance for a scientific study with the aim of 
detecting issues related to social policy within the framework of regional development. But what 
is the most likely proxy for violent crime? Homicide is often used as the “best” realistic proxy 
because it is readily measurable and a good indicator of capturing the level of security in any 
country. The relevance of studying homicide is embedded in the fact that it is the ultimate crime 
when a human being kills another whose ripple effects transcends fear to all and sundry. 
Furthermore, according to UNODC (2013) Report, violent criminals use homicide as a tool to 
perpetuate their activities and achieve their material goals. Hence, because homicide affects 
people from all walks of life the need to look at this problem from different angles is justified. 
Statistics from the Report show that in 2012, the death of more than half a million people across 
the globe is caused by intentional homicide. 36% of those deaths occurred in Latin America, 
Africa recorded 31%, Asia 28%, Europe 5% and Oceania 0.3% respectively. 
On the drivers of violent rates, several factors have been identified with the key driver 
being income inequality. The literature on the relationship between income inequality and violent 
crime is still very sparse compared to other types of criminal acts like property crime, theft, 
burglary, robbery, fraud, embezzlement, forgery, larceny and so on. However, the link between 
inequality and crime in general has been stressed by the three main theories of crime:  Becker 
(1968) economic theory of crime; the social disorganisation theory of Shaw and McKay (1942) 
and Merton (1938). Central to these theories is the undenying fact that income inequality is 
criminogenic1. In the economic theories of crime, individuals relate the apportionment of time 
spent between market (economic) and criminal activities. They compare the expected returns 
from each activity, and taking account of the likelihood of being caught and severity of 
punishment. Hence, if the expected returns from the latter is higher than the former and the 
chances of being caught and punished are low, the incentive to engage in more criminal activities 
rises. Also, in these models, income inequality leads to crime when low-income individuals who 
have low returns from market activities are placed within the proximity of high-income individuals 
who have assets worth taking or killing for. Empirical findings support the hypothesis that inequality 
is a strong predictor of crime rate (Ouimet, 2012; Han, Bandyopadhyay, & Bhattacharya, 2013; 
Enamorado, López-Calva, Rodríguez-Castelán, & Winkler, 2014). Thus, a simple analogy can be 
drawn that factors that determine inequality invariably determine crime rates.  
This study situates on Africa because increase in violent crime have been observed in 
the continent since the 2000s. For instance, the Southern African region historically holds the 
highest rate of violent crimes on record (with Central America) having rates four times higher 
                                                 
1
This is a situation or system likely to cause criminal behaviour. 
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than the global average of 6.2 per 100,000 population with South Africa, Namibia and Lesotho 
driving this trend. Next is North Africa and East Africa with rising crime rates attributable to 
political violence such that Kenya and Uganda both showing increases since 2004 (UNODC, 
2013). Likewise on income inequality, the continent boasts as having one of the highest 
inequality amidst global comparison. Using the Gini index as the measure of income inequality, 
the second most unequal region in the world after Latin America is Africa (Milanovic, 2014; 
Klasen, 2016). This finding is not new probably because it is also the result of the congenital 
inequality Africa obtained from colonialism upon attaining independence (Leibbrandt, Finn, & 
Woolard, 2012; Piraino, 2015). Facts further reveal that by 2010, six of the ten most-unequal 
countries in the world were in Africa (AfDB, 2012) with the sub-region of Southern Africa 
showing a striking concentration of countries which suffer from remarkably high income 
inequality levels. These countries are Namibia, Comoros, South Africa, Angola, Botswana, 
Lesotho and Swaziland, a crime-inequality pattern can thus be gleaned from this analysis. If 
income inequality drives violent crime, then it is envisaged that a positive relationship occurs 
such that countries with high inequality indices will have high rate of violent crime while lower 
levels of violent crime are generally related to higher levels of development, as well as to lower 
levels of income inequality. In other words, factors that drive crime rates equally drive income 
inequality. Figure 1 shows the graphical representation of crime-inequality relationship in Africa 
on sub-regional basis. The figure shows a pattern that sub-regions with high Gini index also 
have high rates of violent crimes with countries located in Southern Africa at the upper right end 
of the plot. West and East African countries are clustered towards the mid-lower left and North 
African countries are at the extreme-lower left. 
 
 
 Figure 1: Scatter plot on homicide rate and Gini index (2007 – 2012)  
Note: CA: Central Africa; EA: East Africa; NA: North Africa; SA: Southern Africa; WA: West Africa 
Source: Authors’ compilation 
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This study presents findings from Africa on the factors driving violent crime and contributes to 
the crime-inequality literature by engaging a balanced panel data of 38 African countries from 
2007 to 2012 for the scientific investigation as no such attempt has been done exclusively for 
the region2. The balanced panel enables the use of dynamic modeling using the two-step 
difference generalised method of moments (GMM) and for constructive analysis, the continent is 
divided into five (5) regions: Central Africa (CA), Eastern Africa (EA), Northern Africa (NA), 
Southern Africa (SA) and Western Africa (WA)3. Even though poor countries are associated with 
high levels of income inequality and crime rates, it is not the intention of this paper to address 
the issue of rising crime rate, but merely investigate factors that contributes to its increase. The 
focus of this research is on violent crime, thus, the wording “crime rate” and “violent crime” is 
used interchangeably throughout the paper, unless something else is specifically stated.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
Without any claim to be exhaustive, some of the determinants of crime rate and the contributory 
factors of crime-inequality nexus in Africa are discussed.  Population and urbanisation are 
known to positively correlate with increase in crime rate (Eide & Showalter, 1999; Brush, 2007; 
UNODC, 2013). Africa is known for its budding population, the continent has the fastest 
population growth projected between now and 2050 and the highest youth population in the 
world. The stark contrast between rich and poor countries is illustrated in the 2013 World 
Population Data Sheet (WPDS). The analogy compares Niger Republic and the Netherlands. 
Although both countries have almost the same population size, Niger is projected to nearly 
quadruple its population from about 17 million today to 66 million in 2050 while that of The 
Netherlands’ will likely grow very slowly from 17 million to 18 million over that same time. Africa 
champions a demographically young population with 43% below age 15 and all of the 10 
countries worldwide with the highest fertility rate are located in Africa. Furthermore, WPDS 
(2013) predicts that Africa’s population is expected to more than double by 2050, rising from 1.1 
billion today to at least 2.4 billion. 
One of the key demographic factors in terms of crime and income inequality is the 
population growth rate, as it is generally argued that poor people tend to have more children. 
Also, it is plausible to find that a bigger rural population and more people employed in 
                                                 
2
The scope is within this period because the 2017 homicide data from United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC) covers 1996 to 2015 with majority of African countries having no statistics for periods prior to 2007 and 
none after 2012. For instance, data for trend analysis in Africa are only available for a handful of countries and for a 
relatively short period of time (since 2004). The limited data available for Northern Africa point to a recent sharp 
increase in violent crime in the sub-region, which is a new and alarming trend largely associated with increased 
social and political instability.  
3
Comprehensive list of countries and regions is shown in Appendix A1 
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agriculture is associated with lower income inequality as the distribution of income is even 
among that social class. Odedokun and Round (2001); Sahn and Stifel (2003) have differing 
opinions regarding the effect of urbanisation. From a sample of African countries, they conclude 
that inequality in living standards tends to worsen in rural areas than in urban areas. Reason 
given is that in a situation where the population rises faster than economic growth, employment 
opportunity will pose a serious challenge resulting in inequitable income distribution and rising 
recourse to engage in criminal activities (Glaeser & Sacerdote, 2000; Fajnzylber, Ledeman, & 
Loayza, 2002). Rapid population growth makes it difficult for economies to create enough jobs 
to lift large numbers of people out of poverty and increases the tendency for the engagement in 
criminal activities (Messner, 1983; Krahn, Hartnagel, & Gartrell, 1986). 
Another important driver of violent crime is the rate of unemployment. The International 
Labour Organisation (ILO) harmonised unemployment rate refers “to those people who are 
currently not working but are willing and able to work for pay or people who are currently 
available to work, and have actively searched for work”. Empirical findings on the impact of 
unemployment rate on crime rate are mixed. Brush (2007) finds that unemployment rate is a 
positive predictor of crime. The opportunity cost to engage in criminal activities is driven by 
youth unemployment (Shaw & McKay, 1942; Sahn & Stifel, 2003; Hove, Ngwerume, & 
Muchemwa, 2013). Youth employment challenges in Africa are often associated with rapid 
population growth rates although the correlation however is not always direct, nor that simple. 
The nexus between the rate of youth employment and population growth rate is somewhat 
complex. As the population grows, the lack of equitable growth and the exclusion of the youth 
from market activities increases. Hence, African countries must safeguard against such crises 
by initiating economic reforms and increasing spending on social services. 
In Africa, low levels of literacy and education in general, can impede the economic 
development of a country in the current rapidly changing, technology-driven world. Levels of 
education in Africa are comparatively low creating a considerable skills gap among youth at 
working age. Based on a panel data that covers both developing and OECD countries from 
1960-1990, De Gregorio and Lee (2002); Perugini and Martino (2008) find that average years of  
schooling, and other  educational factors, contribute positively to a more equal distribution of 
income. They show the empirical evidence linking education to income distribution. In his 
famous paper, Barro (2000) concludes that primary and secondary education have significant 
negative impact on income inequality while tertiary education exacerbates inequality. Some 
other studies find that primary and secondary education are equalising variables while higher 
education further widens the inequality gap (Lochner & Moretti, 2004; Lo Prete, 2013).  
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Lastly, the existence of effective institutions may curb the perpetuation of criminal activities. For 
instance, a rape crime victimises the person. The family and community of the victim can be 
considered as secondary victims in the event that when justice is not served, impunity can lead 
to further victimisation in the form of the denial of the basic human right to justice (UNODC, 
2013). Hence, if institutions are weak evidenced with flagrant disregard for the rule of law 
increase in violent crime may be the likely results. In addition, weak institutions lead to high 
levels of corruption prevalent in most African countries. 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
Data 
Study uses a panel data on 38 African countries from 2007 to 2012. Since having substantial 
data points is essential for panel data analysis, countries without data (see Appendix Table A2) 
on the Gini index and homicide rates, proxy for violent crime, are dropped not only to minimise 
‘holes’ in the data but also to balance the ‘trade-off’ between sample size, richness and power of 
the explanatory variables (Barro, 2000; Brush, 2007). The variables are briefly discussed below. 
 
Outcome Variable 
The outcome variable is violent crime. Globally, crime is classified into two groups: violent and 
property crimes. Murder, rape, assault and armed robbery are classified as violent crimes while 
burglary, theft, larceny, fraud and embezzlement are categorized as property crimes. Of these 
groups; property crimes suffer mostly from under-reporting in countries where the people have lost 
confidence in the police and judicial systems, where the level of education is abysmally low, and 
perhaps where inequality is high. Of the violent crime category, psychological trauma and social 
stigma often prevent rape victims from reporting assault while armed robbery may go unreported if 
the stolen assets is of a lower value and/or if the incident results in no loss of life, thus only data on 
murder is adequately captured as the loss of a human life will have to be reported.  
 
Explanatory Variables 
Most empirical papers employ the Gini index as the measure of income inequality (Krohn, 1976; 
Witt, Clarke, & Fielding, 1999; Nilsson, 2004; Brush, 2007) due to the fact that it is easily to compute 
and the data is readily available compared to other income measures like the Palma ratio, the 
Atkinson index, Theil index, purchasing power parity, income shares, variance of log-income, the 
Robin Hood index and the coefficient of variation. Following previous empirical studies (Witte & 
Witt, 2001; Brush, 2007), another economic factor that affects violent crime is unemployment rate 
as there exist the general belief that unemployment is positively correlated with violent crime. Since 
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unemployment may reduce legal returns from work, the tendency to engage in criminal acts further 
widens. This variable measures the impact of the ratio of able-bodied individuals who are willing to 
work but find none. To adequately capture the influence of unemployment on crime rate, a novel 
approach is introduced with five categories of unemployment including youth unemployment and 
male unemployment. This is because studies show that at the global level about 95% of violent 
crime perpetrators are male (UNODC, 2013) and that young men are more prone to engage in 
criminal activities than the rest of the population, this means that the lure to participate in crime is 
higher at the initial stage of adulthood (Bound & Freeman, 1991; Grogger, 2000). Education 
variables (primary, secondary and tertiary) test the impact of education on the decision to engage in 
criminal activities through several channels. These are school enrolment ratios, although empirical 
literatures have mixed views as to their impact on crime rate. As noted by Witt et al. (1999) 
schooling generates benefits beyond the private return received by individuals and education 
increases the cost associated with incarceration, since more educated individuals will experience 
greater losses in earnings while in jail. However, on a rational note, a higher educational attainment 
is expected to reduce crime rate. The age dependency ratio indicator is included. This captures the 
percentage of those within the working-age. It is the percentage of those employed to total 
population. The ratio is high if a greater proportion of people are employed and low ratio can be 
seen as a positive sign, especially for young people, if it is caused by an increase in the time 
devoted to their education. The share of population living in urban areas is included in the model. 
Empirical findings on the effect of increase in urban dwellers on crime rate are mixed. To some, 
increase in urbanisation imply increase in economic growth and therefore a fall in inequality as 
people move to the city from rural areas (Galor & Zeira, 1993; Eide & Showalter, 1999). While some 
studies show that higher homicide rates occur in urban areas even though the metropolis tend to 
accommodate both the risk of homicide occurring and the protection of the citizenry. The deterrence 
variable, death penalty is included to test if countries that uphold the death penalty at a particular 
time have lower homicide rates. It takes the value 1 if countries have the death penalty in a 
particular year and 0 otherwise. However, it is evident that countries allowing the death penalty have 
higher homicide rates (Grogger, 1990; Hunt, 2004; Zimmerman, 2006). The rule of law index is 
included to test for the impact of quality institutions and good governance. The index ranges from -
2.5 (weak governance) to 2.5 (strong governance) and it is expected that as a country’s index 
improves, crime rate is curbed. Lastly, five (5) regional dummies, CA, EA, NA, SA and WA are 
added to control for region heterogeneities. Each takes the value 1 if countries belong to that region 
and 0 otherwise. The empirical approach is to perform a stepwise regression such that the 
explanatory variables will be included sequentially into the model to observe whether the predictive 
significance of income inequality on crime rate still holds. 
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Empirical Model 
Following research in related fields, the use of both static and dynamic models are employed: 
pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) and two-step difference GMM. The pooled OLS estimator 
captures not only the variation of what emerges through time or space, but the variation of these 
two dimensions simultaneously. Similarly, the model is estimated using robust and 
homoscedasticity-consistent standard errors, as proposed by White (1980) to correct for the 
possible existence of heteroscedasticity and to remove the effect of outliers. The pooled OLS 
linear model is given as: 
 
           
 
                     [1] 
where,  , the constant term; i,, countries, 1, 2……..N;  t, time, 1, 2…..T,      , vector of 
observed time-variant factors and their regression coefficients;    , vector of observed time-
invariant factors and their regression coefficients,    denotes unobserved country-specific 
effects and     denotes the unobserved random error term.  
Estimating equation [1] may lead to several econometric problems because some 
explanatory variables are assumed to be endogenous due to correlation with the error term. 
Similarly, the time-invariant country characteristics (fixed effects) may be correlated with the 
explanatory variables. In addition, a static model will not adequately capture the persistent 
nature of violent crime and the short and long-run impacts of the regressors on the outcome 
variable, hence a dynamic model is employed which addresses the problems of omitted 
variables, measurement error, endogeneity, and country-specific heterogeneity. The estimator 
that best addresses these issues is the generalised method of moments (GMM) popularised by 
Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995). The GMM estimator is a specialised 
variant of the instrumental variables approach such that the consistency of the parameters 
obtained depends critically on the validity of the moment conditions (i.e. instruments) of which 
the authors outlined two specification tests. The Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions is 
first. Failure to reject the null hypothesis of instruments validity gives support to the choice of the 
instruments. The test for serial correlation of the error term is the second. Failure to reject the 
null hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation implies that the original error term is serially 
uncorrelated and the moment conditions are correctly specified (Roodman, 2014). The two-step 
difference-GMM model specification is given as: 
Δ        ɸΔ            
 
               Δ   .  [2] 
where,         denotes the lag of the dependent variable,   controls for time dimension and     
is the composite error term which includes country-fixed effects.   
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A Priori Expectations 
In line with the theory of economics of crime (Becker, 1968) and justifications for including the 
regressors, positive coefficients are expected for the Gini index, death penalty, and 




Data Summary and Correlation Analysis 
The summary statistics is conducted on regional basis in comparison with the full sample. From 
Table 1, the average rate of violent crime and Gini index for the 38 selected countries are 8.08 
and 58.04 respectively. Among the regions, Southern Africa has the highest averages for both 
indicators at 14.21 and 60.67. Generally, all the sub-regions in SSA exhibit high inequality 
index. Other statistics are as shown. 
 











Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Violent Crime 8.04 9.16 5.58 3.39 6.7 2.61 2.04 2.09 14.21 12.78 4.85 3.44 
Gini Index 58.08 4.28 57.88 2.27 58.23 2.18 54.83 3.23 60.67 6.03 56.93 2.21 
Age Dependency 80.12 18.28 90.72 9.44 80.28 19.81 56.95 12.32 77.91 19.27 88.9 8.74 
Urban Pop. Rate 40.49 15.63 43.36 15.08 33.61 21.35 57.96 8.82 36.56 13.44 39.83 8.92 
Rule of Law -0.56 0.55 -1.14 0.36 -0.51 0.32 -0.4 0.38 -0.2 0.62 -0.8 0.43 
Death Penalty 0.23 0.42 0.25 0.44 0.29 0.46 0.2 0.41 0.18 0.39 0.26 0.44 
Primary Enrol. Rate 103.95 19.27 99.39 16.55 106.53 24.02 106.35 7.38 113.81 13.95 92.16 19.73 
Secondary Enrol. Rate 47.07 23.73 34.77 15.1 42.3 19.13 67.15 26.49 52.09 26.37 37.65 14.09 
Tertiary Enrol. Rate 10.74 9.79 5.43 3.82 4.45 1.77 22.12 11.62 12.57 11.48 7.89 3.25 
Total Unem. Rate 9.85 7.31 7.63 4.2 5.27 3.41 11.46 2.58 16.3 9.26 5.99 2.93 
Youth Unem. Rate 17.76 14.02 12.56 7.57 9.25 6.97 24.79 6.69 29.71 17.05 9.15 4.29 
Male Unem. Rate 8.7 6.65 6.53 3.46 4.38 2.84 9.7 2.67 14.62 8.66 5.47 2.22 
Female Unem. Rate 11.84 8.65 9.2 5.59 6.34 4.33 17.39 5.39 18.33 9.99 6.77 4.27 
Youth Male Unem. Rate 16.05 13.21 10.54 5.9 8.37 6.85 21.67 6.58 27.65 16.32 8.08 3.22 
Youth Female Unem. Rate 20.8 16.58 16.15 11.86 10.22 7.34 34.2 13.55 32.35 18.41 10.64 6.45 
Note: SD = Standard Deviation 
Source: Authors' Computations 
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Further, the correlation analysis in Table A3 (see Appendix) shows the potential relationships 
between violent crime and the regressors. As expected, the Gini index, death penalty, 
unemployment rates with the exception of female unemployment rate have positive correlation 
while the rule of law index, and education have negative relationships. However, there is need 
to subject these relationships for empirical testing to understand the exact nature of influence of 
these regressors on violent crime. No correlation statistic is above 0.80, hence no evidence of 
multicollinearity in the data. 
 
Panel Data Modeling Issues 
This study pays attention to issues that often arise in panel data modeling some of which are 
justifications for the usage of key indicator(s), the problems of slope homogeneity and cross-
sectional dependence. The key indicators for this study are the Gini index which is the measure 
of income inequality and the homicide rate which is the proxy for violent crime. From the 
summary statistics in Table 1, the Gini index shows considerable variability across the four sub-
regions and for the full sample. The standard deviation ranges from 2.18 (East Africa) to 6.03 
(Southern Africa) and 4.28 for the full sample. Similarly for violent crime, the standard deviation 
ranges between 2.09 (Northern Africa) and 12.78 (Southern Africa) with 9.16 for the full sample. 
These statistics show that there are sufficient variability in these indicators to justify their use in 
testing the study’s research hypotheses. 
Likewise, for slope homogeneity and cross-sectional dependence, the goal is to test if 
there exists unusual patterns in the data for both violent crime and income inequality variables 
over time and space which in essence is testing the homogeneity of the regression slope 
coefficients across the 38 countries in the panel. For one, the test for homogeneity is needful to 
check whether both variables have consistent pattern that is representative of the selected 
countries. According to Pesaran and Yamagata (2008), Baltagi (2005) and Baltagi, Feng, and 
Kao (2012) tests for slope homogeneity are only applicable to macro panels having long time 
series (over 20 - 30 years), however not applicable in this study given the short time dimension 
of 6 years (2007 to 2012). However, to show the relative homogeneity, the trend of both 
variables with their mean values are plotted on sub-regional basis.  
Figure 2 reveals that across the sub-regions, unobserved variables do not change 
overtime and that the violent crime indicator clusters around its mean value except for Southern 
Africa which shows larger values and a wider disparity from others. By and large, the inclusion 
of Southern Africa is not expected to cause estimation bias.  
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Figure 2: Plot of homicide rate and its averages across 5 sub-regions (2007 – 2012) 
Note: CA: Central Africa; EA: East Africa; NA: North Africa; SA: Southern Africa; WA: West Africa 
Source: Authors’ compilation 
 
Likewise, Figure 3 indicates that the unobserved variables do not change overtime and the Gini 
index for the sub-regions clusters around its mean value which is relatively same across board. 
However, Southern Africa shows a larger disparity from the rest. Again, this is not expected to 
cause any estimation bias. Overall, the assumption of slope homogeneity holds given the 
relative similarity of both indicators across the sub-regions which justifies the use of the pooled 
OLS and difference GMM estimation techniques. 
 
 
Figure 3: Plot of Gini Index and its averages across 5 sub-regions (2007 – 2012) 
Note: CA: Central Africa; EA: East Africa; NA: North Africa; SA: Southern Africa; WA: West Africa 
Source: Authors’ compliation 
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On the other hand, cross-sectional dependence (CSD) which is similar to testing for serial 
correlation in time series analysis checks if the residuals across units in the panel are not 
correlated. According to Phillips and Sul (2003) and Baltagi et al. (2012), testing for cross-
sectional dependence relates to panel data models with small T and large N as in this case. 
Ignoring sufficient CSD can decrease estimation efficiency and undermine the gains from the 
pooled least squares estimator. Importantly, having pooled a population with the assumption of 
homogeneous slope coefficients, ignoring CSD can diminish the efficiency of the pooled least 
squares estimator, invalidates conventional t-tests and F-tests which use standard variance-
covariance estimators. Testing for CSD is not applicable to this study due to few common 
observations across the panel this outcome is observed across all the various model 
specifications. 
 
Pooled OLS Results 
Columns [1] to [5] of Table 2 shows the results for the baseline model in column [1], column [2] 
with the addition of the Gini index, columns [3] to [5] has the inclusion of urban population, death 
penalty and rule of law index. Findings reveal that across the five model specifications, age 
dependency ratio has a reducing impact on violent crime in with three of those being statistically 
significant at the 5% level. Likewise the Gini index provides significant evidence as a strong 
predictor of crime across the model specifications.  
These findings are consistent with the related literature that points to Gini index as a 
strong predictor of homicide rates (Kelly, 2000; Choe, 2008; Ouimet, 2012; Han et al., 2013). 
As predicted the coefficients of death penalty and rule of law index have the expected signs 
and significant at the 1% level respectively. The result for death penalty indicates that 
countries that uphold policy on death penalty will have an increase in homicide rate 
compared to those who have abolished the policy. A position confirmed by several 
criminometricians4 that the death penalty is not a deterrent factor (Grogger, 1990; Daly, 
Wilson, & Vasdev, 2001; Neumayer, 2003; Hunt, 2004; Soares, 2004; Zimmerman, 2006). 
The impact of the rule of law index supports earlier empirical work on the importance of good 
governance in reducing crime rates (Fajnzylber et al., 2002; Neumayer, 2003; Adeleye, 
Osabuohien, & Bowale, 2017). On regional classifications, statistically significant evidence 
shows that crime is higher in Southern Africa but lower in North Africa relative to West Africa 
(base region). This could be explained by historical factors, as in the case of South Africa 
(Odedokun & Round, 2001). 
                                                 
4
Researchers who study criminal behaviour within socio-economic and demographic frameworks. 
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Table 2  Pooled OLS Results (Dep. Variable: Violent Crime) 
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
Constant 13.7289** -28.3180** -22.0058 -31.8137*** -26.8989** 
 
(2.58) (-2.50) (-1.33) (-3.21) (-2.46) 
Age Dependency -0.1217** -0.0746 -0.1112 -0.0951** -0.1198** 
 
(-2.10) (-1.63) (-1.37) (-2.14) (-2.33) 
Gini Index 
 
0.6846*** 0.7118*** 0.7444*** 0.6954*** 
  
(4.03) (4.42) (4.92) (4.29) 








   
7.0963*** 
 
    
(3.38) 
 
Rule of Law 
    
-2.9445** 
     
(-2.03) 
Central Africa 1.1950 0.5015 0.3089 1.8457 0.0847 
 
(0.99) (0.42) (0.18) (1.42) (0.07) 
East Africa 1.4598 -0.2508 -1.5070 -0.5834 0.2418 
 
(1.16) (-0.21) (-0.88) (-0.49) (0.18) 
North Africa -6.8152*** -3.8038* -4.1955* -4.0398** -4.0653** 
 
(-3.01) (-1.86) (-1.86) (-2.01) (-2.06) 
Southern Africa 8.3813*** 5.4276** 4.4957** 5.4680*** 6.7699*** 
  (4.53) (2.50) (2.42) (2.79) (2.74) 
 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs. 132 132 121 132 132 
R-Squared 0.317 0.415 0.410 0.514 0.427 
F Statistic 5.771 11.686 9.943 9.933 12.072 
 
Notes: ***, **, *are statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively;  
t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on White heteroscedasticity-consistent std. errors 
Source: Authors’ Computations 
 
The plot of the fitted values of the Gini index against violent crime shown in Figure 4 reveals the 
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Figure 4: Plot of Homicide Rate and Fitted Values of the Gini Index 
Source: Authors’ compilation 
 
Results in Table 3 columns [6] to [8] show that with the systematic inclusion of the education 
variables, the Gini index is still a strong and positive predictor of violent crime at the 1% 
level. Of the three education variables, only primary enrolment rate shows a 1% statistically 
significant reducing effect which may not be surprising considering that many African 
countries pursue a free primary education agenda which allows children from rich and poor 
households have access to basic education. 
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Table 3 Pooled OLS Results (Dep. Variable: Violent Crime) 
Variables [6] [7] [8] 
Constant -4.7095 -45.9034** -42.3347*** 
 
(-0.33) (-2.41) (-2.79) 
Age Dependency -0.0591 0.0644 0.0182 
 
(-1.14) (0.67) (0.43) 
Gini Index 0.6105*** 0.7280*** 0.8335*** 
 
(3.47) (4.11) (3.28) 












Tertiary Enrol. Rate 
  
0.1090 
   
(1.42) 
Central Africa 1.6123 -1.2259 -1.2978 
 
(1.19) (-0.74) (-0.86) 
East Africa 2.0856 -1.1757 -0.1214 
 
(1.24) (-0.68) (-0.09) 
North Africa -2.6198 -3.3747 -3.1469 
 
(-1.18) (-1.28) (-1.52) 
Southern Africa 7.5802*** 5.2545* -1.1509 
  (2.90) (1.74) (-0.85) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs. 114 94 80 
R-Squared 0.476 0.431 0.454 
F Statistic 13.147 10.030 4.396 
Notes: ***, **, *are statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively; t-
statistics (in parentheses) are based on White heteroscedasticity-consistent std. errors 
Source: Authors’ Computations 
 
The theoretical link and empirical findings between unemployment and crime is quite strong 
(Stack, 1984; Britt, 1997; Doyle, Ahmed, & Horn, 1999). Results in columns [9] to [14] of Table 4 
reveal that unemployment exacerbates crime with positive and statistically significant 
coefficients at the 1% level. These finding support earlier studies such as Witt et al. (1999) and 
UNODC (2013) where outcomes reveal that high crime rate is associated with increase in male 
unemployment. This study provides a new evidence that female unemployment and female 
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youth unemployment have positive predictive powers on violent crime at the 1% significance 
level. This is an important contribution to the crime-inequality literature. 
 
Table 4 Pooled OLS Results (Dep. Variable: Violent Crime) 
Variables [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] 
Constant -23.1624** -23.2853* -18.8423* -28.9545*** -19.6708 -30.6081*** 
 
(-2.25) (-1.95) (-1.91) (-2.87) (-1.58) (-2.66) 
Age Dependency -0.0530 -0.0422 -0.0701 -0.0344 -0.0744 -0.0186 
 
(-1.13) (-0.76) (-1.58) (-0.68) (-1.29) (-0.36) 
Gini Index 0.5227*** 0.5306*** 0.4755*** 0.6219*** 0.5234*** 0.6238*** 
 
(3.28) (3.29) (2.88) (4.11) (3.17) (4.01) 
Total Unem. Rate 0.5806*** 
     
 
(4.47) 
     
Youth Unem. Rate 
 
0.2469*** 
    
  
(5.08) 
    
Male Unem. Rate 
  
0.6514*** 
   
   
(4.71) 
   
Female Unem. Rate 
   
0.4729*** 
  
    
(4.53) 
  
Youth Male Unem. Rate 
    
0.2062*** 
 
     
(3.95) 
 
Youth Female Unem. Rate 
     
0.2308*** 
      
(6.27) 
Central Africa -1.5740 -1.1431 -0.8435 -2.2614 -0.2991 -2.2663 
 
(-1.15) (-0.91) (-0.65) (-1.56) (-0.25) (-1.61) 
East Africa 0.8312 0.4403 1.4623 0.1577 0.7032 0.1123 
 
(0.61) (0.33) (1.07) (0.12) (0.51) (0.09) 
North Africa -6.714*** -7.093*** -6.583*** -8.278*** -6.949*** -8.0535*** 
 
(-3.41) (-3.32) (-3.34) (-3.82) (-3.09) (-3.72) 
Southern Africa -0.8823 0.5101 -0.4737 -0.8316 1.6061 0.1489 
  (-0.66) (0.27) (-0.37) (-0.56) (0.75) (0.08) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs. 128 128 128 128 128 128 
R-Squared 0.559 0.505 0.566 0.547 0.477 0.529 
F Statistic 12.181 13.468 11.773 12.513 12.426 13.928 
Notes: ***, **, *are statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively; t-statistics  
(in parentheses) are based on White heteroscedasticity-consistent std. errors 
Source: Authors’ Computations 
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2-Step Difference-GMM Results 
Having controlled for endogeneity and omitted variables, results shown in columns [1] to [4] of 
Table 5 provide evidence that income inequality is a strong and positive predictor of violent 
crime in the short-run at the 1% significance level while the covariates are statistically not 
significant.  
 
Table 5 Difference-GMM Results (Dep. Variable: Violent Crime) 
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Violent Crime _1 -0.3546 -0.6236 -0.3231 -0.3546 
 
(-0.99) (-1.05) (-0.88) (-0.99) 
Age Dependency 0.7536* 1.0684 0.6023 0.7536* 
 
(1.90) (1.44) (1.28) (1.89) 
Gini Index 0.1764*** 0.1779*** 0.1757*** 0.1764*** 
 
(3.15) (2.96) (3.13) (3.13) 















   
0.0000 
  
   
(.) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs. 68 68 68 68 
F Statistic 60.246 9.190 56.222 51.851 
Groups/Instruments 24/12 24/13 24/13 24/12 
AR(2) 0.647 0.927 0.632 0.647 
Hansen Statistic 0.461 0.444 0.365 0.326 
 
Notes: ***, **, *are statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively; 
 t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on White heteroscedasticity-consistent std. errors; 
p-values reported for AR(2) and Hansen statistic 
Source: Authors’ Computations 
 
Controlling for the education variables, similar results are obtained in Tables 6 columns [5] 
to [7] which provide significant evidence on the positive predictive power of inequality on 
violent crime. However, all the education regressors are also not statistically significant.  
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Table 6  Difference-GMM Results (Dep. Variable: Violent Crime) 
Variables [5] [6] [7] 
Violent Crime_1 -0.3539 0.4343** 0.1123 
 
(-0.97) (2.33) (0.43) 
Age Dependency 0.5246 0.2943 0.5132 
 
(1.39) (0.46) (1.53) 
Gini Index 0.1833*** -0.0024 -2.4163* 
 
(3.06) (-0.06) (-1.86) 


















Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs. 54 45 34 
F Statistic 15.333 30.281 8.917 
Groups/Instruments 23/13 19/13 15/13 
AR(2) 0.555 0.469 0.265 
Hansen Statistic 0.383 0.452 0.515 
 
Notes: ***, **, *are statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively; t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on White 
heteroscedasticity-consistent std. errors; p-values reported for AR(2) and 
Hansen statistic 
Source: Authors’ Computations 
 
With the inclusion of unemployment variables, results shown in Table 7 columns [8] to [14] are 
not significantly different from those already established as the findings reveal that inequality 
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Table 7 Difference-GMM Results (Dep. Variable: Violent Crime) 
Variables [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] 
Violent Crime _1 -0.2435 -0.3156 -0.3241 -0.1292 -0.3504 -0.2570 
 
(-0.63) (-0.97) (-0.96) (-0.29) (-1.09) (-0.78) 
Age Dependency 0.7654* 0.7688* 0.7639* 0.7332 0.7749* 0.7727** 
 
(1.95) (1.96) (2.01) (1.63) (1.91) (2.18) 
Gini Index 0.1544** 0.1710*** 0.1707*** 0.1335** 0.1744*** 0.1640*** 
 
(2.78) (3.57) (3.49) (2.13) (3.71) (3.49) 
Total Unem. Rate 0.1216 
     
 
(0.71) 
     
Youth Unem. Rate 
 
0.0531 
    
  
(0.59) 
    
Male Unem. Rate 
  
0.0741 
   
   
(0.46) 
   
Female Unem. Rate 
   
0.1684 
  
    
(0.99) 
  
Youth Male Unem. Rate 
    
0.0499 
 
     
(0.51) 
 
Youth Female Unem. Rate 
     
0.0704 
  
     
(0.98) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs. 66 66 66 66 66 66 
F Statistic 74.883 64.706 80.396 74.742 78.418 56.994 
Groups/Instruments 23/13 23/13 23/13 23/13 23/13 23/13 
AR(2) 0.721 0.672 0.663 0.83 0.666 0.677 
Hansen Statistic 0.335 0.386 0.426 0.29 0.433 0.326 
Notes: ***, **, *are statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively; t-statistics (in 
parentheses) are based on White heteroscedasticity-consistent std. errors; p-values reported for AR(2) and 
Hansen statistic 
Source: Authors’ Computations 
 
CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The major findings of this paper are that the income inequality is a significant positive predictor 
of violent crime. Other significant fallouts are surmised as follows: primary education has a 
crime-reducing impact, the death penalty is not a deterrent factor, the rule of law has a crime-
reducing effect, unemployment aggravates violent crime and violent crime is higher in Southern 
Africa while lower in North Africa relative to West Africa. However, violent crime does not seem 
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to be counter-cyclical, and criminal inertia is not significant. Hence, for a drastic reduction in 
violent crime, policy complementarities are required. Policies must be geared towards those 
indicators that have significant impact on crime rates with the aim of enhancing those with 
negative effects and correcting those with positive effects. For instance, priority must be 
accorded to institutional quality, that is, the enforcement of the rule of law and concerted efforts 
towards strengthening the judicial system. Educational reforms are pivot to reducing inequality 
by ensuring that education inequality is minimised via the provision of basic education. 
Governments’ actions to increase supply and quality of public education from primary to 
secondary level will aid in bridging the income gaps between the rich and the poor. Since 
countries that uphold the death penalty have higher rates of violent crimes which shows that it is 
not a deterrent factor, it is suggested that other alternatives to capital punishment be explored. 
In the same vein, concerted efforts must be geared toward reducing the unemployment rate by 
creating the enabling environment through the provision of basic infrastructures. These will 
provide the incentives to engage in grass-root farming, small-scale trading and also encourage 
entrants of large investors. Hence, failure to address these key issues will result in the failure of 
any policy channelled towards reducing crime rate. Although comprehensive, further research 
questions relating to both income inequality and criminality remain to be answered. Lack of data 
can severely hinder the ability to test a range of postulates. It is important to test the impact of 
other control variables, such as narcotics (production and trade), natural endowments, religion, 
culture, democracy and political institutions on violent crime. Moreover, it is of interest to explore 
crime rates for categories other than violent crime. 
 
REFERENCES 
Adeleye, N., Osabuohien, E., and  Bowale, E. (2017). The Role of Institutions in the Finance-Inequality Nexus in Sub-
Saharan Africa. Journal of Contextual Economics, 137, 173-192.  
AfDB. (2012). Income Inequality in Africa. Briefing Notes for AfDB’s Long-Term Strategy.  Retrieved from 
https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Policy-
Documents/FINAL%20Briefing%20Note%205%20Income%20Inequality%20in%20Africa.pdf 
Arellano, M., and  Bond, S. (1991). Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an 
Application to Employment. Review of Economic Studies Limited, 58(1), 277-297.  
Arellano, M., and  Bover, O. (1995). Another Look at the Instrumental Variable Estimation of Error-Components 
Models. Journal of Econometrics, 68(1), 29-51.  
Baltagi, B., Feng, Q., and  Kao, C. (2012). A Lagrange Multiplier Test for Cross-Sectional Dependence in a Fixed 
Effects Panel Data Mode. Center for Policy Research Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Working 
Paper No. 137, 1-41.  
Baltagi, B. H. (2005).  Econometric Analysis of Panel Data (3rd ed.). New York: Wiley. 
Barro, R. J. (2000). Inequality and Growth in a Panel of Countries. Journal of Economic Growth, 5, 5-32.  
Becker, G. S. (1968). Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach. Journal of Political Economy, 169-217.  
Bound, J., and  Freeman, R. B. (1991). What went wrong? The Erosion of Relative Earnings and Employment Among 
Young Black Men in the 1980s. Retrieved from  
International Journal of Economics, Commerce and Management, United Kingdom 
 
Licensed under Creative Common   Page 21 
 
Britt, C. L. (1997). Reconsidering the Unemployment and Crime Relationship: Variation by Age Group and Historical 
Period. Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 13 (4)(4), 405-426.  
Brush, J. (2007). Does Income Inequality Lead to More Crime? A Comparison of Cross-Sectional and Time-Series 
Analyses of United States Counties. Economics Letters, 96(2), 264-268. doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2007.01.012 
Choe, J. (2008). Income Inequality and Crime in the United States. Economics Letters, 101(1), 31-33. 
doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2008.03.025 
Daly, M., Wilson, M., and  Vasdev, S. (2001). Income Inequality and Homicide Rates in Canada and the United 
States. Canadian Journal of Criminology, 219-236.  
De Gregorio, J., and  Lee, J.-W. (2002). Education and Income Inequality: New Evidence from Cross-Country Data. 
Review of Income and Wealth, 48 (3)(3).  
Doyle, J. M., Ahmed, E., and  Horn, R. N. (1999). The Effects of Labor Markets and Income Inequality on Crime: 
Evidence from Panel Data. Southern Economic Journal, 65 (4)(4), 717-738.  
Eide, E. R., and  Showalter, M. H. (1999). Factors Affecting the Transmission of Earnings Across Generations: A 
Quantile Regression Approach. Journal of Human Resources, 253-267.  
Enamorado, T., López-Calva, L.-F., Rodríguez-Castelán, C., and  Winkler, H. (2014). Income Inequality and Violent 
Crime. The World Bank Policy Research Working Paper WPS6935, 31.  
Fajnzylber, P., Ledeman, D., and  Loayza, N. (2002). What causes violent crime? European Economic Review, 46, 
1323-1357.  
Galor, O., and  Zeira, J. (1993). Income Distribution and Macroeconomics. Review of Economic Studies, 60, 35-52.  
Glaeser, E. L., and  Sacerdote, B. (2000). The Social Consequences of Housing. Journal of Housing Economics, 9 
(1)(1), 1-23.  
Grogger, J. (1990). The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: An Analysis of Daily Homicide Counts. Journal of the 
American Statistical Association, 85(410), 295-303.  
Grogger, J. (2000). An Economic Model of Recent Trends in Violence. Journal of Criminology, 266-287.  
Han, L., Bandyopadhyay, S., and  Bhattacharya, S. (2013). Determinants of Violent and Property Crimes in England 
and Wales: A Panel Data Analysis. Applied Economics, 45(34), 4820-4830. doi:10.1080/00036846.2013.806782 
Hove, M., Ngwerume, E. T., and  Muchemwa, C. (2013). The Urban Crisis in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Threat to Human 
Security and Sustainable Development. Stability: International Journal of Security and Development, 2(1), Art. 7.  
Hunt, T. (2004). Does the Death Penalty Deter Murder?  
Kelly, M. (2000). Inequality and Crime. Review of Economics and Statistics, 82(4), 530-539.  
Klasen, S. (2016). What to do about Rising Inequality in Developing Countries? Retrieved from Kiel, Germany:  
Krahn, H., Hartnagel, T. F., and  Gartrell, J. W. (1986). Income Inequality and Homicide Rates: Cross‐National Data 
and Criminological Theories. Criminology, 24(2), 269-294.  
Krohn, M. D. (1976). Inequality, Unemployment and Crime: A Cross‐National Analysis. The Sociological Quarterly, 
17(3), 303-313.  
Leibbrandt, M., Finn, A., and  Woolard, I. (2012). Describing and Decomposing Post-apartheid Income Inequality in 
South Africa. Development Southern Africa, 29(1), 19-34. doi:10.1080/0376835x.2012.645639 
Lo Prete, A. (2013). Economic Literacy, Inequality and Financial Development. Economics Letters, 118(1), 74-76. 
doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2012.09.029 
The Effects of Education on Crime: Evidence From Prison Inmates, Arrests and Self-Reports, 8605 C.F.R. (2004). 
Merton, R. K. (1938). Social Structure and Anomie. American Sociological Review, 3, 672-682.  
Messner, S. F. (1983). Regional Differences in the Economic Correlates of the Urban Homicide Rate. Criminology, 
21(4), 477-488.  
Milanovic, B. (2014). Description of All The Ginis Dataset. World Bank, Research Department.  Retrieved from 
www.worldbank.org/en/research/brief/all-the-ginis 
Neumayer, E. (2003). Good Policy Can Lower Violent Crime: Evidence from a Cross-National Panel of Homicide 
Rates, 1980-97. London: LSE Research Online.  
©  Adeleye & Jamal 
Licensed under Creative Common   Page 22 
 
Nilsson, A. (2004). Income Inequality and Crime: The Case of Sweden. Institute of Labour Market Policy Evaluation 
(Working Paper), 6.  
Odedokun, M. O., and  Round, J. I. (2001). Determinants of Income Inequality and its Effects on Economic Growth: 
Evidence from African Countries. Working Paper: UNU/WIDER.  
Ouimet, M. (2012). A World of Homicides: The Effect of Economic Development, Income Inequality, and Excess 
Infant Mortality on the Homicide Rate for 165 Countries in 2010. Homicide Studies, 16(3), 238-258. doi:DOI: 
10.1177/1088767912442500 
Perugini, C., and  Martino, G. (2008). Income Inequality within European Regions: Determinants and Effects on 
Growth. Review of Income and Wealth, Series 54(Number 3, (September 2008)).  
Pesaran, M. H., and  Yamagata, T. (2008). Testing Slope Homogeneity in Large Panels. Journal of Econometrics, 
142(2008), 50–93.  
Phillips, P. C. B., and  Sul, D. (2003). Dynamic Panel Estimation and Homogeneity Testing Under Cross section 
Dependence. Economics Journal, 6(2003), 217–259.  
Piraino, P. (2015). Intergenerational Earnings Mobility and Equality of Opportunity in South Africa. World 
Development, 67(1), 396–405.  
Roodman, D. (2014). xtabond2: Stata Module to Extend xtabond Dynamic Panel Data Estimator. Statistical Software 
Components.  
Sahn, D. E., and  Stifel, D. C. (2003). Urban-Rural Inequality in Living Standards in Africa. Journal of African 
Economies, 12 (4)(4), 564-597.  
Shaw, C., and  McKay, H. (1942).  Juvenile Deliquency and Urban Areas: Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1942. 
Soares, R. R. (2004). Development, Crime and Punishment: Accounting for the International Differences in Crime 
Rates. Journal of Development Economics, 73(1), 155-184. doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2002.12.001 
Stack, S. (1984). Income Inequality and Property Crime: A Cross-National Analysis of Relative Deprivation Theory. 
American Journal of Criminology, 22(2), 229-257.  
UNODC. (2013). Global Study on Homicide. Retrieved from Vienna: https://www.unodc.org/gsh/ 
Witt, R., Clarke, A., and  Fielding, N. (1999). Crime and Economic Activity: A Panel Data Approach. Brit. J. Criminol, 
39 (3)(3).  
Witte, A. D., and  Witt, R. (2001). Crime Causation: Economic Theories. Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice. 
Macmillan Reference, USA.  
WPDS. (2013). World Population Data Sheet.   Retrieved from 
http://www.prb.org/Publications/Datasheets/2013/2013-world-population-data-sheet/data-sheet.aspx 
Zimmerman, P. R. (2006). Estimates of the Deterrent Effect of Alternative Execution Methods in the United States: 
1978–2000. American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 65(4), 909-941.  
 
  
International Journal of Economics, Commerce and Management, United Kingdom 
 




Table A1 List of countries: 
S/No. Country Code Region Income Group Gini Category 
1 Algeria DZA NA UMInc MI 
2 Angola AGO SA UMInc HI 
3 Benin BEN WA LInc MI 
4 Botswana BWA SA UMInc VHI 
5 Cameroon CMR CA LMInc MI 
6 Central African Republic CAF CA LInc VHI 
7 Chad TCD CA LInc MI 
8 Cote d'Ivoire CIV WA LMInc HI 
9 Djibouti DJI EA LMInc MI 
10 Egypt, Arab Rep. EGY NA LMInc MI 
11 Ethiopia ETH EA LInc MI 
12 Ghana GHA WA LMInc HI 
13 Guinea GIN WA LInc MI 
14 Kenya KEN EA LInc HI 
15 Lesotho LSO SA LMInc VHI 
16 Liberia LBR WA LMInc HI 
17 Madagascar MDG SA LInc HI 
18 Malawi MWI SA LInc MI 
19 Mali MLI WA LInc MI 
20 Mauritania MRT NA LMInc MI 
21 Mauritius MUS SA UMInc LI 
22 Morocco MAR NA LMInc HI 
23 Mozambique MOZ SA LInc HI 
24 Namibia NAM SA UMInc VHI 
25 Niger NER WA LInc MI 
26 Nigeria NGA WA LMInc HI 
27 Rwanda RWA EA LInc HI 
28 Sao Tome and Principe STP CA LInc HI 
29 Senegal SEN WA LMInc MI 
30 Seychelles SYC EA UMInc VHI 
31 Sierra Leone SLE WA LInc MI 
32 South Africa ZAF SA UMInc VHI 
33 Swaziland SWZ SA LMInc HI 
34 Tanzania TZA EA LInc MI 
35 Togo TGO WA LInc MI 
36 Tunisia TUN NA UMInc MI 
37 Uganda UGA EA LInc HI 
38 Zambia ZMB SA LMInc VHI 
Notes: Central Africa; East Africa; North Africa; Southern Africa; West Africa; UMInc = upper middle income;  
LMInc = lower middle income; LInc = lower income; VHI = very high inequality; HI = high inequality;  
MI = medium inequality  
Source: Authors’ Compilation 
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Table A2   Data Description and Sources 
S/No. Variables Short Description Data Source(s) 
1 
Intentional homicides  (per 
100,000 people)  
Death purposely inflicted by 
another person per 100,000 
people 
United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime (UNODC) 2017 
2 Gini Index  
Index of 0 represents perfect 
equality, while an index of 1 
implies perfect inequality. 
Lahoti et al (2016) 
3 Age Dependency Ratio 
This is the percentage of 
working-age to the population  
World Bank (2017) 
4 Rule of Law Index  
Rule of Law (proxy for good 
governance). Estimate on good 
governance ranges from -2.5 
(very weak) to 2.5 (very strong). 
World Bank (2017) 
5 Death Penalty  
Dummy variable that takes the 
value 1 if the country has a death 
penalty in that year and 0 
otherwise. Constructed by author 
www.deathpenaltyinfo.org  
6 
School enrolment, primary 
(% gross)  
Gross enrolment ratio is the ratio 
of total enrolment that officially 
completes primary education. 
 
World Bank (2017) 
7 
School enrolment, 
secondary (% gross)  
Gross enrolment ratio is the ratio 
of total enrolment that officially 
completes secondary education. 
 
World Bank (2017) 
8 
School enrolment, tertiary, 
male (% gross)  
Gross enrolment ratio is the ratio 
of total enrolment that officially 
completes tertiary education. 
World Bank (2017) 
9 Unemployment, youth total  
Percentage of total labour force 
ages 15-24 (modeled ILO 
estimate) 




Percentage of female labour 
force ages 15-24 (modeled ILO 
estimate) 
World Bank (2017) 
11 Unemployment, youth male 
Percentage of male labour force 
ages 15-24 (modeled ILO 
estimate) 
World Bank (2017) 
12 Unemployment, total  
Percentage of total labour force 
(modeled ILO estimate) 
World Bank (2017) 
13 Unemployment, male 
Percentage of male labour force 
(modeled ILO estimate) 
World Bank (2017) 
14 Unemployment, female 
Percentage of female labour 
force (modeled ILO estimate) 
World Bank (2017) 
15 Urban population 
Percentage of total population 
living in urban areas as defined 
by national statistical offices.  
World Bank (2017) 
16 
Central Africa, East Africa, 
North Africa, Southern 
Africa and West Africa 
Dummy variables that take the 
values of 1 if a country is located 
in that region and 0 if otherwise. 
Constructed by author. 
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